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Bob’s Out, the Croc Is In: Continuity or 
Change in Zimbabwe? 
Roger Southall 
Abstract: The military-assisted ousting of Robert Mugabe as president of 
Zimbabwe and his replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa was widely 
welcomed by Zimbabweans. However, hopes of significant change were 
dashed by the nature of his cabinet appointments, which indicated 
greater continuity than change vis-à-vis the Mugabe era. Mnangagwa is 
likely to pursue an agenda of authoritarian reform: rendering the econ-
omy more attractive for foreign investment while maintaining political 
control from above. 
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The ousting of Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe by the military 
in November 2017 was greeted with wild enthusiasm throughout the 
country. Thousands of people poured onto the streets, their celebrations 
conveyed to the world by a huge global media entourage that descended 
upon the capital, Harare. The message was clear: Ordinary Zimbabwe-
ans, including even those who counted themselves supporters of the 
Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), would 
back any measure that would force the departure of the 93-year-old 
Mugabe, whose seeming intent had been to remain as president until he 
died. Even more, the excited welcoming of the military signified popular 
antipathy to the looming prospect that the ageing dictator would anoint 
his wife, Grace, as his successor.  
Zimbabweans were expressing a very loud “no” to any idea of dyn-
astic politics. Many were prepared to grant Mugabe exalted status as hav-
ing led the struggle for liberation from colonial rule, yet it seemed that 
most were agreed that he had long outstayed his welcome. Hence it was 
that, once the military had finally prevailed upon a highly reluctant Mu-
gabe to resign, Zimbabweans hailed the elevation of Emmerson Mna-
ngagwa to the presidency. Nevertheless, most had reservations about him, 
for Mnangagwa was not nicknamed “the Crocodile” for nothing. He was 
known to be cunning, ruthless, and brutal. 
The military’s intervention had been sparked by Mugabe’s dismissal 
of Mnangagwa as one of his two vice presidents on 7 November 2017, 
justifying this on grounds of the latter’s alleged disloyalty. Given that 
Mnangagwa had been vying with Grace Mugabe for the nomination to 
succeed her husband as president, in a factional struggle that had se-
verely divided ZANU-PF, this was taken as a clear sign that Mugabe was 
now unambiguously backing his wife. Warned that his life was in danger, 
Mnangagwa immediately took to his heels, fleeing to Mozambique (after 
a failed bid to cross the border into South Africa), but vowing that he 
would soon be back.  
He was true to his word. The military intervened just a week later, 
pre-empting Mugabe’s plans to conduct a purge among senior members 
of the military, including dismissing General Constantino Chiwenga, 
head of the armed forces. It took another week to secure Mugabe’s exit 
before Mnangagwa, now back in the country, was elected interim presi-
dent of ZANU-PF on 19 November. He was subsequently inaugurated 
as Zimbabwe’s new president on 22 November (ISS 2017). 
Prior to this, the military had been at pains to stress that its actions 
did not amount to a “coup.” Indeed, a “coup” would never have done, 
because it would have alienated both the African Union (AU) and the 
 Continuity or Change in Zimbabwe? 83 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), which had both 
committed to refusing to recognise unconstitutional changes of govern-
ment. The military was also desperate to avoid other African nations, not 
least neighbouring countries, perceiving that it removed Mugabe directly, 
for he was widely regarded as a hero of liberation.  
However, once the armoured cars rolled onto the streets in Harare in 
the early-morning hours of 14 November, no one was left in doubt about 
who was now in charge. But when General Chiwenga took to the air-
waves, he was insistent that the military was merely performing its con-
stitutional obligation to maintain security. Furthermore, he gave assur-
ances that President Mugabe and his family were safe and unharmed, and 
that their security was guaranteed. He went on to explain that the army 
was targeting “counter-revolutionaries” and the “criminals” who had 
infiltrated ZANU-PF, surrounded the president, and were plundering 
Zimbabwe. In practice, those so identified were Grace Mugabe’s chief 
allies within the ruling party (known as Generation 40, or G40), their 
distinguishing feature, in military eyes, being that they had played no part 
in the liberation struggle. If they had been allowed to take power, stated 
Chiwenga, Zimbabwe would have become a “neo-colony” (Dixon 2017). 
Nonetheless, in whatever way the military’s intervention was dressed 
up, the unannounced intention was always to force Robert Mugabe to 
retire and to make way for Mnangagwa, who had long enjoyed a close 
association with the security forces. Once this objective had been attained, 
and the Grace Mugabe threat neutralised, the army chiefs were happy to 
withdraw to the barracks, although they had now made it explicit that they 
claimed the right to determine who should hold political power.  
Whether they would be able to control events was less certain. 
Some, looking on, claimed that the military was changing nothing of 
substance, that their continued backing of ZANU-PF merely inaugurated 
an era of “Mugabe-ism without Mugabe” (Maromo 2017; Melber 2017). 
Certainly, Zimbabweans had few illusions that Mnangagwa was intent on 
launching a transition to democracy, although many had hopes that he 
would drive sufficient reforms to render life more tolerable than it had 
been during the last days of Mugabe. Even so, there were those who 
harboured hopes that the military had opened Pandora’s box and that, in 
the long run, power would slip through their fingers. However, in the 
short term, their hopes were to be confounded, for Mnangagwa’s first 
move was to provide the top military with ample reward. 
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Re-asserting Military Influence:
Mnangagwa’s First Cabinet 
During the days that Mugabe was seeking to cling to power, somehow 
trying to stave off the reality of his humiliation, civil society activists and 
opposition politicians had been calling for the appointment of a transi-
tional government to prepare the country for new elections. It was a sign 
of desperation – of popular weariness with ZANU-PF’s woeful man-
agement of the economy and its crude authoritarianism – that ordinary 
people in the street looked to Mnangagwa as a harbinger of change. True, 
during Mugabe’s latter years in power, he had indicated his support for 
certain economic reforms – notably, restoration of ties with international 
creditors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank – yet his pragmatism was likely to go only so far, and it was unlikely 
to extend as far as deliberately inaugurating a transition to democracy. 
As Zimbabweans well knew, Mnangagwa had been one of the prin-
cipal architects of ZANU-PF’s security state. A guerrilla leader before 
independence, he was minister of state security during the Gukurahundi 
in the early 1980s (the brutal crackdown upon ZANU-PF’s rival liber-
ation movement, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, and its support 
base in Matabeleland). Although Mnangagwa has always denied his in-
volvement in the massacre of some 20,000 Ndebele, he had been organ-
ically involved in the decisions taken by a close-knit group of political 
leaders and military commanders who sought to eliminate the opposition 
(Doran 2017a, b). Thereafter, he had orchestrated ZANU-PF’s militar-
ised campaign against the opposition in the 2008 general election, which 
retained the presidency for Mugabe, denying victory to the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) and, with South Africa’s backing, forcing 
it into a coalition with ZANU-PF. As minister of defence during the 
Government of National Unity (GNU), Mnangagwa played a key role in 
ensuring that the security apparatus remained loyal to the interests of 
ZANU-PF. Later, as vice president from 2014, his politicking to succeed 
Mugabe gained the backing not only of the most powerful elements 
within the military, who were determined to retain their influence, but 
also that of the generation of liberation fighters within ZANU-PF 
(Mdlongwa 2017). In short, although Mnangagwa used his inauguration 
speech to assert that as president he would serve “all citizens, regardless 
of colour, creed, religion, tribe, totem or political affiliation” (Chronicle 
2017), there should have been little doubt that, fundamentally, he would 
remain loyal to the ruling party. But it was to be a ZANU-PF purged of 
the contamination of Grace Mugabe and the G40. 
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While pledging reforms to revive the economy and run a govern-
ment that recognised Zimbabwe’s political diversity, Mnangagwa gave 
short shrift to any talk of forming a new coalition. Instead, his first cabi-
net was designed to establish his authority within ZANU-PF, build 
bridges to potential opponents within the party, and re-assert the ruling 
party’s alliance with the military. As such, it came as a major disappoint-
ment to the mass of Zimbabweans who had been hoping, against the 
odds, that Mnangagwa would separate the wheat from the chaff.  
Rather than appointing anyone to office from outside the ZANU-PF 
core, Mnangagwa’s appointments, totalling about half of his cabinet, came 
from his inner circle of friends and comrades he had known most of his 
life; they, in turn, would serve alongside those stayovers from Mugabe’s 
last cabinet, most of the latter “steeped in non-delivery” (Games 2017). 
Obert Mpofu, who as minister of mines had been massively implicated in 
corruption around diamonds mined in Marange in Eastern Zimbabwe, 
was reappointed as minister of home affairs. Also remaining in their re-
spective posts were David Parirenyata and Lazarus Dokora. The very best 
that could be said of the former was that his miserable performance in the 
health portfolio had been eclipsed by the even worse record of the latter 
in education. Both had failed to maintain the modest revivals that had 
taken place under the GNU in these key sectors. 
Another appointment from the old guard was the reinstatement of 
Patrick Chinamasa as minister of finance. He had been sacked from that 
post by Mugabe a few weeks before the military intervention because of 
his alignment with Mnangagwa. He had long experience in the portfolio, 
having served in the post both prior to the GNU and after the 2013 
election. Many held him responsible for the country’s looming debt 
crisis, though his own efforts to control departmental budgets and ration 
allocations of scarce foreign currency had been constantly sabotaged by 
lack of support from Mugabe, who himself had incurred huge expenses 
with his extensive foreign travel (where he was nearly always accompa-
nied by Grace and huge entourages). Over the years, Chinamasa, too, 
had engaged in numerous negotiations with international funders, and 
had rhetorically incorporated their demands for economic reform into 
his policies. Under Mnangagwa, Chinamasa could now hope that at least 
some of his cabinet colleagues might respect his authority and that his 
policies could actually be implemented. 
The appointment that attracted the most criticism was that of Air 
Marshal Perence Shiri as minister of lands and rural settlement. He had 
commanded the notorious Fifth Brigade, which had been responsible for 
some of the worst atrocities during the Gukurahundi, and he was deeply 
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unpopular and widely feared as a result. He had played a hands-on role in 
the Command Agriculture programme, supervised by Mnangagwa in the 
previous government. Essentially a maize import-substitution drive, it had 
consumed significant government subsidies for only marginal returns. He 
would now be expected to boost food production at a time of renewed 
upsurge in violence on some of the few farms left in white hands.  
Shiri’s appointment was accompanied by that of Major General Si-
busiso Moyo as minister of foreign affairs, whose principal claim to pub-
lic fame was that it had been his face that had first appeared on television 
to announce the military intervention. Otherwise, he was little known 
outside military circles, although he had been implicated by a UN report 
in the looting of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s minerals fol-
lowing the Zimbabwean army’s intervention into that country’s disas-
trous civil war (UN 2001). It would seem that both he and Shiri were re-
warded for their key roles in steering the military intervention (Thorny-
croft 2017; Games 2017). 
Nearly three weeks after appointing his cabinet, Mnangagwa an-
nounced the appointment of his two vice presidents. The first (and un-
doubtedly, though unofficially, the most senior) was Chiwenga, who had 
paved the way for this by announcing his retirement from the army. The 
second vice president would be veteran ZANU-PF politician Kembo 
Mohadi, whose most recent posts had been as minister of state for na-
tional security in the President’s Office from 2015 to 2017, and minister of 
defence, security and war veterans after that. Both appointments suggested 
that the influence of the security forces within the government would 
loom even larger than it had under Mugabe, an impression reinforced by 
Chiwenga also taking over as minister of defence from Mohadi. 
The response of  opposition forces to the new government was 
voiced by Tendai Biti, the minister of  finance during the GNU. He de-
nounced it as both a “betrayal of  Zimbabwe” and a “military junta” 
(Thornycroft 2017). Others deplored the re-entrenchment of  a failed pol-
itical elite. However, what mattered most in the immediate future for the 
large majority of  Zimbabweans was whether the new government, for all 
its historical baggage, could facilitate a speedy revival of  the economy. 
Reviving a Corpse? The Economy
under Mnangagwa 
The military intervention was precipitated by Mugabe’s dismissal of 
Mnangagwa and his plans to move against the latter’s supporters amongst 
the senior military, but the factional struggles within ZANU-PF played 
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out against a backdrop of economic crisis and popular fears that the 
country was, once again, lurching towards an uncontrollable spiral of 
inflation. Because the government was running out of money, it was 
again massively expanding the money supply. Tax revenues and exports 
were falling, the banking system was starved for cash, unemployment 
stood at over 90 per cent, poverty was rife, and public health services 
had largely collapsed. Meanwhile, it seemed to many that the political 
elite remained largely unaffected, unconcerned about the economic dis-
aster befalling the vast majority of the population. 
Popular cynicism was fuelled by memories of the runaway inflation 
caused by ZANU-PF incompetence and profligacy that had been respon-
sible for incomes and savings collapsing in the years leading up to the 2008 
election. Ultimately, the government had had little option but to scrap the 
Zimbabwe dollar in favour of a basket of other currencies. Within a short 
time, this came to mean the de facto reign of the US dollar.  
The adoption of the US dollar as the principal medium of exchange 
stabilised the economy remarkably quickly. Subsequently, with Tendai 
Biti, then of the MDC, as minister of finance, policies became more ra-
tional, and the economy recorded remarkably high rates of growth, albeit 
from a low base. These were years at which Zimbabweans would later 
look back with nostalgia. However, having effectively lost the last election 
in 2008, ZANU-PF wanted to ensure it did not repeat the mistakes it had 
made; its retention of control over the electoral machinery ensured that it 
swept back to power in 2013. Within a short span of time, it had returned 
to its familiar policy mix of profligacy, corruption, and populist econom-
ics. Unsurprisingly, the supply of money began to dry up. 
ZANU-PF had faced major problems since resuming its monopo-
listic control over the government. Above all, dollarisation meant that 
the cost of Zimbabwe’s exports on international markets was high. Worse, 
the dramatic collapse in agricultural production since the early 2000s 
(following the appropriation of white farms) alongside the decimation of 
the country’s manufacturing industries had meant that there was rela-
tively little to export anyway. Tobacco production had recovered some-
what (although the quality of tobacco was lower than it used to be, so 
returns were less in relative terms). Meanwhile, the introduction of a 
policy by the government that mines should be 51 per cent Zimbab-
wean-owned had done nothing to entice inward investment or boost 
exports during an era in which most commodity prices had fallen any-
way. In short, the capacity of the economy to earn US dollars by selling 
goods externally had fallen dramatically, and the supply of money circu-
lating within the country had dried up. 
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Faced by a looming debt crisis, the ZANU-PF government resorted 
to three key strategies. One was to issue “bond notes” by the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Officially, bond notes were designed to swell 
the amount of money in circulation within the country. The problem was 
that, being issued by a government that had presided over hyper-inflation, 
nobody trusted them. Accordingly, when ZANU-PF announced it would 
issue bond notes, there was a run on the banks, as depositors sought to 
withdraw dollars as fast as they could.  
The RBZ had responded by limiting the amount of dollars individu-
als could withdraw to a trickle, forcing depositors to queue for hours to 
lay hands on their own money, a little bit at a time (if they were lucky). 
As a result, there had been a massive collapse of confidence in the banks, 
with nobody wanting to keep their money in them. Meanwhile, however 
reluctant people were to use bond notes, they were sometimes forced to 
accept them because of the sheer shortage of “real” money. Accordingly, 
when they could, they resorted to selling them to informal currency 
dealers, illegally, at a huge discount. 
The second strategy had been to rapidly expand the real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS), or electronic money, system for everyday trading. 
Because it needed to hoard its scarce supply of dollars, the government 
had resorted to paying its employees in electronic form (although salaries 
were quite often paid late). While this had enabled employees to pay their 
bills electronically, they had rarely been able to convert the notional sums 
of dollars they held in the bank into real cash, nor had they been able to 
send such dollars outside the country, unless they could gain special 
permission from the Reserve Bank. Meanwhile, with the rate of inflation 
again rapidly increasing, people had begun to spend their bank balances 
as quickly as possible. 
Yet, it was the third strategy pursued by the government that really 
fuelled Zimbabwe’s increasingly bizarre financial system. Since 2013, 
government expenditure had steadily increased year by year, despite the 
country earning very little internationally. The ZANU-PF government 
may have hoped to fund itself using its old trick of literally printing 
money by expanding the supply of bond notes. However, such was the 
negative popular reaction to these, with ordinary people fearing that they 
were a step towards the reintroduction of the Zimbabwean dollar, that 
the RBZ seems to have restricted their issuance.  
Instead, the government funded its rising costs by issuing treasury 
bills. There were few takers for these, but – with things as they were – 
the banks had little option but to buy them. As inward investment into 
Zimbabwe had dried to a trickle, there was little else for the banks to 
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spend their money on, and the interest rates that the government had 
promised to pay were, at face value, attractively high. In any case, what-
ever their reluctance, the banks were also placed under considerable 
political pressure to lend to the government, even though they were very 
much aware that they might never get their money back.  
Whereas the coalition GNU recorded budget surpluses for three of 
the four full years in which the opposition controlled the treasury, the 
ZANU-PF government recorded deficits of 186 million USD and 125 
million USD in 2014 and 2015. Before his dismissal as minister of fi-
nance by Mugabe in October, Patrick Chinamasa had projected a deficit 
of 1.41 billion USD for 2017. In sum, the government was again heading 
for bust, and was again printing money to cover its spiralling costs and 
propelling the economy towards another bout of mega-inflation. How-
ever, with an election looming in 2018, ZANU-PF under Mugabe was 
adamant that it did not want to cut back. Far from it, it wanted to carry 
on spending, as fast as it could, hoping against hope that the reckoning 
could be postponed by yet further borrowing (Southall 2018). 
Having worked so closely with Mugabe over the years, Mnangagwa 
was complicit in the mess he was inheriting. Nonetheless, he was known 
to have backed the various efforts by Chinamasa to implement the sort 
of reforms that would open the way to re-engaging with international 
creditor bodies such as the IMF, World Bank, and African Development 
Bank. It was therefore no great surprise that he used his inauguration 
speech to signal that such reforms would now take place.  
Whilst declaring that the land reforms could never be reversed, he 
announced that the white farmers from whom the land was taken would 
be compensated “in terms of the law of the land.” Meanwhile, the bene-
ficiaries of the land reform were exhorted to demonstrate commitment to 
national food security. However, while economic policy would be predi-
cated on agriculture as the country’s mainstay, emphasis would be put 
upon creating the right conditions for foreign investment and job cre-
ation. Physical and social infrastructure would be repaired and expanded 
in readiness for growth and the provision of public services; enterprise 
would be encouraged and rewarded; corruption would be curbed; and 
public servants were warned that they would now have to “roll up [their] 
sleeves in order to deliver.” He also indicated that immediate and urgent 
attention would be given to the liquidity challenges that had bedeviled the 
nation. Export procedures would be relaxed in order to ease the earning 
of foreign currency; investors would be lured by the establishment of 
special economic zones (SEZ); and measures would be taken to stabilise 
the banking system and to encourage saving. Finally, with a view to sat-
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isfying Zimbabwe’s creditors, Mnangagwa promised that the whole of 
government (“including local government and state-owned enterprises”) 
would ensure that both domestic and external debt obligations would be 
serviced (Chronicle 2017). ZANU-PF had made promises many times be-
fore and delivered worse than little. The question now was whether Mna-
ngagwa would have the will and the capacity to deliver.  
There were reasons to suggest that he would at least try. For a start, 
the Zimbabwean economy was in such dire straits that it was manifest to 
all but the most politically myopic that something drastic needed to be 
done, even if cynics might suggest this would only be to prevent the col-
lapse of ZANU-PF’s extensive patronage machine. Beyond that, how-
ever, there were elements of Mnangagwa’s speech that indicated a break 
with the past. Under Mugabe, for instance, it was unlikely that a com-
mitment would have been made to allow “elements of a market econ-
omy” to flourish and that such strong emphasis would have been placed 
upon attracting foreign investment. Given that foreign investors had been 
waiting to invest in Zimbabwe for years, attracted by the country’s rich 
natural resources, decent (albeit run-down) infrastructure, and relatively 
well-educated population, there was some reasonable prospect of early 
and relatively easily attained gains (as had been made during the GNU). 
Nonetheless, in the short term, it was obvious that if any progress 
was to be made, and most particularly, if the liquidity crisis was to be 
resolved, that Zimbabwe would need to be bailed out. There was some 
speculation that Mnangagwa would look to China (Pilling 2017); indeed, 
only days after he took office, Zimbabwe entered into a 153 million USD 
loan agreement to expand and refurbish Harare Airport (Business Day 
2017). However, for all that Mnangagwa referred to the Chinese as “all-
weather friends,” it seemed highly unlikely that they would extend loans 
without demanding some very substantial concessions that might hobble 
the economy in the future. For the moment, therefore, the most pressing 
issue was to work out a deal to clear Zimbabwe’s debt arrears to the 
World Bank and African Development Bank (so that the government 
could resume borrowing!). But if Zimbabwe was going to secure the help 
of donors and multilateral institutions, it was likely that Mnangagwa’s 
government would need to promise both political and economic reforms. 
Towards Authoritarian Reform? 
There is much in the transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa to suggest 
continuity rather than change. Although his succession to the presidency 
represents the comprehensive defeat of the G40 faction, the composition 
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of his first cabinet indicates Mnangagwa’s care in placating the established 
ZANU-PF elite and assuring the military of his fidelity to its historical 
vision of liberation. Despite his commitments that his government would 
rule on behalf of all Zimbabweans, he defied pleas for the formation of an 
inclusive, cross-party transitional government. Above all, he went out of 
his way to praise Mugabe, hailing him as his “father, mentor, comrade-in-
arms” and as “my leader,” even assuring Mugabe that “our history will 
grant him his proper place and accord him his deserved stature as one of 
the founders and leaders of our nation” (Chronicle 2017).  
Mnangagwa demonstrated his readiness to help solidify that stature, 
in both financial and legal terms: despite the country’s parlous financial 
state, Mugabe received a handsome golden handshake of some 10 mil-
lion USD, along with promises of immunity from prosecution and guar-
antees that his presidential salary would be paid until his death and that 
no action would be taken against his family’s business interests. He 
would also have an official residence, with a staff of 20, and fully funded 
foreign travel up to four times a year. Grace Mugabe was assured that 
she would continue to receive half the presidential salary following Mu-
gabe’s death (although this was presumably conditional on her behaving 
herself and keeping a low profile) (Burke 2017; The Guardian 2017). Mean-
while, although some very rough treatment by the military had been 
dished out to some of Mugabe’s closest allies (notably his last minister of 
finance, Ignatius Chombo), some of those who had fled had been assured 
that they could return to the country and live in freedom – including 
former vice president Phelekezela Mphoko, who made an early return 
from Botswana. 
Mnangagwa’s commitment to maintaining ZANU-PF’s hold on 
power was manifest. At the same time, it was equally clear that he recog-
nised the need for international legitimation, and that this had to go 
beyond receiving the (easy) endorsement of neighbouring regimes if he 
was to secure the funding vital for resurrecting Zimbabwe’s broken 
economy. To that end, he had given early assurances that the election 
scheduled for 2018 would take place (although it seemed it was likely to 
take place later in the year than had been expected). Yet his problem was 
that international creditors would require that it should be reasonably 
“free and fair,” and would condemn any repeat of the shenanigans that 
had underpinned ZANU-PF’s skewed electoral success in 2013.  
For the 2018 elections to be deemed credible, the government will 
need to engage with the opposition and civil society and signal its com-
mitment to the establishment of a fairer electoral playing field. This 
would involve, inter alia, “measures to guarantee a credible and verifiable 
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voters roll; the independence and capacity of, as well as parliamentary 
oversight over, the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission; and the removal 
of the Executive’s ability to veto election observers” as well as the cre-
ation of a political atmosphere free of violence, coercion, and intimida-
tion, and a curtailing of ZANU-PF’s partisan manipulation of national 
resources for electoral purposes (ICG 2017). 
Achieving such an agenda will be a tall order, and even if he himself 
commits to the needed electoral reforms, it is more than likely that Mna-
ngagwa will meet strong resistance from within ZANU-PF, and very pos-
sibly from within the military as well. However, if the Zimbabwean econ-
omy is to receive the international backing it so desperately needs, some 
extensive re-engineering of the electoral machinery is going to be required.  
Given that the international agencies are likely to withhold their 
support unless Mnangagwa makes firm commitments on reforms, he will 
have little other option but to play ball. This, in turn, will require that he 
live up to his reputation as the Crocodile and meet resistance to electoral 
reforms from within the ranks of his regime head on. Behind the scenes, 
he will try to convince the doubters that, come what may, ZANU-PF 
will stay in firm control. In this endeavour he will probably be assisted by 
the opposition parties, which remain extraordinarily divided and unlikely 
to unite behind a single presidential candidate and party formation or 
coalition capable of giving ZANU-PF a decent run for its money, espe-
cially if the economy begins to pick up before the election. 
Rather than sustaining “Mugabe without Mugabe-ism,” Mnangagwa 
is enough of a realist and pragmatist to recognise that there is no way out 
of the present Zimbabwean crisis without some substantial political and 
economic reform. Against that backdrop, he is a very unlikely democrat. 
Consequently, he will seek to meet popular pressures from below by im-
posing authoritarian reform from above.  
Change there will be: economic improvements and greater political 
freedoms. Yet Mnangagwa is likely to adhere to an extremely limited 
notion of democracy. As he himself has stated, “ZANU-PF will continue 
ruling no matter what, while those who oppose it will continue barking” 
(cited in ICG 2017). And if the opposition barks too loud, the Crocodile 
won’t hesitate to bite.1 
 
1  I would like to thank David Moore of the University of Johannesburg for valu-
able comments on an early draft of this paper. 
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Bob’s Out, the Croc Is In: Kontinuität oder Wandel in Zimbabwe? 
Zusammenfassung: Die vom Militär Zimbabwes unterstützte Entfer-
nung Robert Mugabes aus dem Präsidentenamt und seine Ersetzung durch 
Emmerson Mnangagwa wurde von den Bürgern des Landes weitgehend 
begrüßt. Durch die Zusammensetzung seines Kabinetts jedoch, die eher 
Kontinuität zur Mugabe-Ära als politischen Wandel signalisierte, wurden 
alle Hoffnungen auf einen deutlichen Wandel enttäuscht. Mnangagwa wird 
voraussichtlich eine Agenda autoritärer Reform verfolgen, indem er ver-
sucht, die Attraktivität des Landes für Auslandsinvestitionen zu steigern 
und gleichzeitig die politische Kontrolle von oben aufrechtzuerhalten. 
Schlagwörter: Simbabwe, Politisches System, Regierungssystem, Regie-
rungswechsel/Machtwechsel, Innenpolitische Lage/Entwicklung 
 
